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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
administered by the Commission of 
Finance of Utah, 
Petitioner and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELBERT I. LUNNEN and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Defendants. · 
Case No. 
7274 
Defendant's Brief· 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Elbert I. Lunnen had worked for a period of over 
twenty years as a welder for Lundin & May Foundry and 
Machinery Company. In the course of his duties he was 
placed in a position where he frequently and continually 
inhaled noxious fumes arising from welding operations. 
About five years ago he began to experience a shortness 
of breath and without medical diagnosis assumed that 
this was in some way connected with the inhalation of 
the welding fumes. He made complaint to his employer 
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at that time and on frequent occasions thereafter. The 
shortness of breath became more prono~nced and the 
claimant had several periods when it was necessary for 
him to lay off work for several days. In 1947 he co11r 
tracted pneumonia which resulted in his being away from 
work for about six weeks. Finally· on the 8th day of 
February, 1948 his shortness of breath became so pro-
nounced that he left work- and reported for treatment to 
Doctors Bauerlein and Hatch. He was advised by Doctors 
·.Bauerlein and Hatch that his shortness of breath prob-
ably in some way resulted from his inhalation of the 
welding fumes and he was advised by them that he 
should not return to his occupation as a welder. However, 
no specific diagnosis of his trouble was ever made at that 
time and he was never advised by Doctors Bauerlein 
and Hatch that his condition would not clear up so that 
he could carry on some gainful occupation other than 
as a welder. 
At their suggestion he reported to the Industrial 
Commission and secured certain blanks to be filled out 
by his physicians. These he turned over to Drs. Bauerlein 
and Hatch but as a complete diagnosis. was never made, 
these forms were not filed with the Commission at that 
time. When Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch did not make a 
complete diagnosis, Mr. Lunnen reported to Dr. Vernon 
Stevenson on July 9, 1948. After a course of observation, 
including x-rays, Dr. Stevenson determined on the 28th 
day of July, 1948 that the claimant's disability arose 
from certain injury to the lungs and diaphragm which he 
determined was caused by the inhalation of gasses from 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
welding operations containing, among other things, 
chlorine, manganese, phosphorous and chrome. Dr. 
Stevenson also determined and advised the claimant 
that his disability \vas permanent and total and that he 
would never again be able to carry on gainful employ-
ment either as a welder or in any other capacity. 
On August 5, 1948 ~Ir. Lunnen filed a written claim 
for compensation with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. Thereafter a hearing was held on such claim and 
award was made to ~fr. Lunnen. This appeal is taken 
from such a\Yard by the Industrial Commission. 
CLAil\1: WAS l\1:ADE WITHIN SIXTY DAYS AFTER 
DISCOVERY OF THE DISABILITY 
In the plaintiff's brief it is maintained that Mr. 
Lunnen was aware of the cause of his disability at the 
time he quit work on February 8, 1948. It is true that he 
was aware in a general way that his illness resulted from 
the inhalation of welding fumes.· This opinion was con,. 
firmed almost immediately by Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch. 
However, such general knowledge is not such knowledge 
as would advise the defendant of his right to recover 
under the Occupational Disease Act for two reasons. It 
will be noted from an examination of Section 42-1a-28 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, that only certain types of 
industrial diseases are brought within the coverage of 
the Occupational Disease Act. As no complete diagnosis 
of the cause of his disability was ever made by Drs. 
Bauerlein and Hatch, Mr. Lunnen had no means of know-
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ing that he was within the scope of the Act. It was not 
until his examination by Dr. Stevenson that it was deter-
mined and he was advised that the chemicals causing his 
trouble were, among other things, chlorine, manganese, 
phosphorous and chrome, all of which are included with-
in the list cotnained in 42-10-28. Furthermore, not until 
the reports of the x-rays were obtained on July 28th was 
there anything to indicate that Mr. Lunnen's disability 
was permanent and total. In order to qualify a claimant 
for an award under the Occupational Disease Act he 
must come within the definition ''Disablement'' as set 
forth in Section 42-la-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
sub-section la. Only where disability is permanent and 
total may a claimant qualify for an award. It will be ob-
served from an examination of the record that Mr. Lun-
nden had had to quit work on several other occasions 
because of irritation of his lungs. However, after a few 
days rest he had always been able to return to the job 
and resume his work. There was nothing at the time he 
quit work on Feb. 8th to indicate that this was not an-
other such occasion and that he would not be able to 
return to work of some kind after a period of rest. 
When he was examined by Drs. Bauerlein and Hatch 
they advised him not to return to his work as a welder 
and advised him it would be best for him to move to some 
warmer and dryer climate. However, there was no indi-
cation given to him at this time that his conditon would 
not clear up if he stayed away from the welding opera-
tio~s nor was there any indication that he would not be 
able to earn a livelihood in some pursuit other than that 
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of a welder. When the x-ray findings were made known 
to him it was evident that he ha.d adhesions on his dia-
phragm \Yhich were permanent, that his condition would 
not clear up and that he could not work in any capacity. 
Therefore, not until July 28, 1948 was Mr. Lunnen able 
to determine tha.t he was eligible for an award under the 
Industrial Disease Act. 
Certainly it cannot be said that there was any lack 
of diligence on his part. He consulted doctors as quickly 
as he left his employment and when he became dissatis-
fied with the progress he was making under the first 
physicians consulted he changed to another doctor. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE INDUS-
TRIAL DISEASE ACT DOES NOT ARISE UNTIL A 
CLAI1IANT WITH DUE DILIGENCE IS ABLE TO 
DETERMINE THAT HE HAS A DISABILITY 
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION 
OF THE STATUTE. 
The plaintiff in its brief states that there are no 
cases decided directly in p-oint with the case now befor.e 
the court. The def en dan ts are unable to agree with this 
contention. While there are no cases yet decided by this 
court there are a number of cases from other jurisdic-
tions passing directly upon the point as to when a cause 
of action arises and the time begins to run in Work-; 
mens Compensation cases. A case directly in point is the 
Cailfornia case of Marsh v. Industrial Commission of 
California, 18 Pac. (2d) 933. In that case the Supreme 
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Court of California had before it three claims, two death 
claims and one disability claim. In each case the em-
ployee had been engaged in the processing of silica prod-
ucts and had developed a related disease to silicosis. 
In each case the claim for allowance had been made be-
yond the statutory period after the last date of employ-
ment. The court disallowed one of the death claims on 
another ground but in passing on the question as to when 
the time began to run in an occupational disease case so 
far as the filing of the claim is concerned the court stated: 
'' F:v.om our study of the subject we are 
brought to the conclusion that in the case of a 
latent and progressive disease such as pneuno-
coniosis it cannot reasonably be said that the in-
jury dates necessarily from the last day of expo-
sure to a dust laden atmosphere and that the pre-
scriptive period begins to run from that day. 
Rather, according to our view, should the cla te of 
the injury be deemed the time when the accumu-
lated effects culminating in a disability traceable 
to the latent disease as the primary cause, and by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is 
discoverable and apparent that a compensable in-
jury "ras sustained in the performance of the 
duties of employment.'' 
Again in the same case the court states: 
I 
"Our Compensation .~..L\.ct expressly provides 
that it shall be liberally construed for the protec-
tion of persons injured in the course of their em-
ployment, and the purpose of such laws is to 
protect workmen, in proper cases, from economic 
insecurity. It is not surprising to find, therefore, 
that in those jurisdictions where occupational dis-
eases are compensable, it is almost universally 
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the rule that the injury is not deemed to occur 
until ascertainable disability results. And it may 
be noted that in our own state it has been held 
that an employee is not to be deprived of com-
pensation because he fails to make a correct medi-
cal diagnosis.'' 
In the Nebraska case of Selders vs. Cornhusker Oil 
Company, 1946 N. ''r· 316, the applic.ant was injured in 
the back by debris violently thrown against him by a 
flood of "'"ater. Although the injury was painful and 
noticeable the claimant, apparently assuming that he had 
merely been bruised, continued at his work as best he 
could. The situation got worse and about nine months 
later he reported to an x-ray technician, who disclosed 
the fracture of a lumbar vertebra. Application for eom-
pensation was made and granted the court holding in 
spite of a six months liinitation that the time began to 
run not from the date of the injury or disability but from 
the time of the discovery of the nature and extent of the 
dis a hili ty. 
In the Nebraska case of Kostron vs. American Pack-
ing Company, 197 N. W. 615, in awarding compensation 
after the running of the statute if the time of the running 
were considered to be at the time of the injury the court 
stated: 
''Accidents frequently occur where the true 
nature of the injury and the resulting disability 
are not discernible for a considerable time even 
with the aid of scientific skill. When latent in-
juries from accidents do not at first indicate dis-
abilities which are compensable, an employee is 
not necessarily deprived of compensation under 
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the Workmen's Compensation Act Compiled 
Statutes 1922, No. 3056, for failure to demand his 
rights under the Act before they can reasonably 
be ascertained.' ' 
A Lousiana case almost exactly in point as the case 
now being considered by the Court is Carroll vs. Inter-
national Paper Company, La. App., 137 So. 907. 
In that case the employee suffered a burn on his lip. 
The burn itself cleared up but a rather painful lump 
remained. After a considerable period of time beyond 
the running of the statute if considered from the date of 
the injury or from the time of the first appearance of 
the lump it was determined that the lump was cancer. 
The court in allowing compensation held that the statute 
did not begin to run until the nature and extent of the 
disability was ascertained. 
In the Utah case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial 
Commission, et al, 140 Pac. ( 2d) 644 the court is con-
cerned under the Occupational Injury Act with the date 
of notice t~ the employer and not with the time of filing 
of the claim and so the case is not exactly in point. How-' 
ever, it is certainly persuasive in the case now before 
the court in that case a fireman while playing hand ball 
in the firemen's gymnasium was struck in the eye with 
the ball on October 22, 1940. The i~jury was not thought 
to be serious and the immediate symptoms cleared up. 
About six months later, however, he began to have 
trouble with his eye and about fourteen months after the 
injury consulted a physician when it was determined that 
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he \vas suffering from sarcoma of the choroid and that 
the only possible treatment was removal of the eye. 
Application for eompensation was filed on March 18, 
1942, notice to the employer also being given at about the 
same time. It ".,.as contended by the employer that the 
compensation should be reduced because of the fact that 
notice to the employer was not given within the statutory 
period. The court nevertheless upheld the award in this 
case. 
Another Utah case \vhieh is very persuasive in this 
case now before the court is Salt l..;ake City vs. Industrial 
Commission, 7 4 Pac. ( 2d) 657 : 
In that case the caretaker of a golf course was struck 
in the eye by a golf ball. The injury at first was thought 
to be not serious. However, later it began to develop 
and some years later resulted in blindness. It was con-
tended that the date of the injury was the date on which 
the cause of action arose and the statute began to run. 
The Supreme Court admitted that such had formerly 
been the rule in the State of Utah but went on to say: 
"This line of cases is based on the Utah Con-
solidated 1\Iinjng Company case, which held that 
the applicant must file his application for com-
pensation for disability within one year from the 
date of the accident. In this regard we think the 
opinion in that case and the cases which followed 
it were in error. Since it does not involve a rule 
of property on which rights were acquired and 
maintained 've think the error should at this time 
be rectified. We think Section 104-2-28 Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, which was at the time of 
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the decision of the Utah Consolidated Mining 
Company case known as Section 6468 Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1917, was applicable as a statute 
of limitations but that it begins to run not from 
the time of accident but from the time of the em-
ployer's failure to pay compensation for disability 
when the disability can be ascertained * * * '' 
An interpretation of when disability can be ascer-
tained is contained in the Connecticut case of Bremmer 
vs. Mark Edlitz & Sons, 17 4 Atl. 172. In that case the 
court holds that the disability is apparent not when it is 
obvious that the claimant is disabled but when it is ob-
vious that he is disabled from a particular identifiable 
disease. The language of the court is as follows : 
''The other implication arising out of the 
case in question is that there must be a clear 
recognition of the symptoms as being that of the 
occupational disease in question. However plain 
is the presence of the sympton itself unless its 
relationship to the particular disease also appears 
there can not be said a manifestation of an as-
sumption of that disease.'' 
While in an ordinary tort case it is true that the 
general rule is that a cause of action arises at the time of 
the negligent or wilful act, a clear distinction exists be-
tween this case and a tort case as in a tort case the lia-
bility is predicted upon the wilful or negligent act or 
omission of the defendant and therefore his act has come 
to rest when the act is done. In the case of an occupa-· 
tional disease, however, the liability is not predicted 
upon any particular act or omission upon the part of the 
defendant but rather merely upon the ultimate disability 
10 
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of the employee whether or not there is any fault on the 
part of the employer. However, even in tort cases there 
are well recognized exceptions to the general rule. For 
example in malpractice cases in many jurisdictions the 
cause of action arises not at the time the doctor commits 
the wrongful act but at the time of discovery. The fol-
lowing language is found at 54 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
143: 
''In some jurisdictions an exception to the 
general rule founded on ignorance of the patient 
of the disability is recognized, so that limitations 
do not run until the patient knows, or with rea-
sonable diligence should know, of the injury or 
cause of dis a hili ty. '' 
In support of this position see the California cases 
of Huysman vs. Kirsch, 57 Pac. (2) 908 and. Ehlen vs. 
Burrows, 124 Pa.c. ( 2) 82. 
In the case of Huysman vs. Kirsch above cited the 
California Supreme Court quotes with approval its o'vn 
decision in the case of lVIarch vs. Industrial · Commis-
sion of California mentioned above with the following 
language: 
"We annulled the awards and held that the 
date of the injury was not the date of the exposure 
nor even the date of the last exposure to>the dust 
laden atmosphere but rather the time when the 
employees became aware that their injuries were 
due to such exposure or when by the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence they might have as-
certained that fact. In other words we held that 
the statute of limitation did not run against these 
employees until they knew the causes of their 
11 
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InJury or by reasonable care and diligence 
should have known the cause of their injury. Our 
decision was amply supported by authorities from 
many jurisdictions. The principle running through 
all these authorities and approved by our decision 
was that the statute of limitation should not run 
against an injured employee's right to compensa-
tion during the time said person was in ignorance 
of the cause of his disability and could not with 
reasonable care and diligence ascertain such 
cause." 
If this court were to hold that the time of the run-
ning of the statute is when the claimant ceases to work 
even though the exact nature of this incapacity had not 
been diagnosed, the only safe course for a person becom-
ing ill and having to quit his job would be to file a claim 
immediately even though he had no knowledge that his 
disease was within the scopt of the statute. Such cer-
tainly could not be the requirement of the legislature. 
If a man is aware that he has an occupational disease 
that is. within the statute and that he is totally and perm-
anently disabled thereby he should make immediate claim 
in order to be fair to his employer and to the insurance 
carrier. If he does not make this claim within the statu~ 
tory period his right to make it is and should be cut off. 
Furthermore his right to make such claim should be 
cut off if he is not diligent in his efforts to determine 
the nature and extent of his trouble. However, to require 
a man to submit a claim stating that he is permanently 
and totally disabled from an occupational disease which 
is within the scope of the statute before he is, with rea-
sonable diligence, able to determine such facts is merely 
12 
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requiring a man to perjure himself in order to protect 
his rights. 
One of the .occupational diseases recognized by said 
section 42-la-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is Derma-
titis. Counsel is a.divsed by medical experts that in order 
to properly diagnose a case of Dermatitis a series of skin 
tests often extending over a period of several months is 
required. If it were to be held that a· cause of action 
arises immediately upon the incurrence qf the disease 
the legislature, in the case of Dermatitis, would be giving 
a man a right of recovery and then immediately taking 
it away from him by a statute of limitations for the rea-
son that the nature of the disease· would prevent him 
from determining whether or not he could properly make 
a claim prior to the time his claim was barred by the. 
statute. Such does not appear to be a reasonable inter-
pretation. 
This court and many oher courts have held that 
workmen's compensation acts should be liberally con-
strued. Certainly a construction that would require 
claimant to make a perjured claim in order to protect his 
rights would not be a liberal construction. Furthermore, 
if in order to protect their rights every person who be-
comes ill on the job should be force(! to make an imm·e-. 
diate claim before he has discovered whether or not his 
illness was merely temporary and would clear up, the 
mountainous pile of applications which would necessarily 
come into the Industrial Commission would place an 
enormous burden on that commis.sion which it could not 
bear. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no question hut that Mr. Lunnen is suffer-
ing permanent and total disability resulting from the 
inhalation of fumes containing chlorine, manganese, 
phosphorous and chrome during the course of his em-
ployment nor is there any question that such occupa-
tional disease is within the scope of 42-la-28, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. The only point rais.ed by the petitioner 
is as to the date of filing of the claim. As Mr. Lunnen's 
claim was filed in writing with the Industrial Commis-
son well within the sixty days after he had with due 
diligence Q_een able to discover that he was suffering 
from an occupational disease within the scope of the 
statute the award was clearly proper and should be up-
held by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of Utah 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & 
RAMP TON, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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